In the logic of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany maintained a good relationship with its NATO ally Portugal, despite it being a dictatorial regime. At the same time, however, the FRG also supported the emergence of democracy in Portugal.

The “best-governed state in Europe” – this is how the Portuguese dictatorship was described by the right-wing intellectual Emil Franzel in 1952. Although this was by no means a majority opinion in the early Federal Republic of Germany, it nevertheless points to the flaw that Germany rarely maintained the necessary critical distance to its dictatorial partner in Portugal. Particularly controversial was the support of the Portuguese Colonial Wars via deliveries of arms, which were only reduced in scope in the mid-1960s due to international pressure. The initial course taken by the CDU and CSU in bilateral relations hardly ever changed, even with the replacement of the CDU by the social-liberal coalition in 1969 under Willy Brandt. The officials in Bonn were optimistic that the liberalisation of the “New State” would come about as soon as Marcello Caetano took office. In order not to endanger the good bilateral relations between the two nations, the Foreign Office refrained from officially supporting opposition forces, as this would have comprised the regime. Instead, in the style of the “Neue Ostpolitik” and with Egon Bahr’s concept of “change through rapprochement”, the Foreign Office tried to persuade the reformist and Europe-oriented forces in Portugal to initiate a regime change.

Against all expectations, the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown before the neighbouring Franco regime. News of the events of April 1974 was greeted with joy in the Foreign Office. Soon, however, this great enthusiasm gave way to even greater concern. In the early power struggle which raged in revolutionary Portugal, the moderate political forces (PS and PPD) were clearly outnumbered by the communist ones. Consequently, the efforts of the Foreign Office and the Chancellery focused primarily on mobilising European social democracy in support of the moderate parties. Likewise, requests for economic aid were met, but only on the condition that free elections would be held in Portugal in March or April 1975. In retrospect, this was a courageous move on the part of the German government, since US foreign policy under Kissinger already considered the Portuguese transition a failure due to communist dominance and was thus discussing the expulsion of Portugal from NATO. In 1976, Schmidt could consequently claim with self-confidence that, in this chapter of world politics, even the Americans had followed German advice.

After the election of the first constitutional government in April 1976, bilateral relations between Portugal and the Federal Republic can be divided into three main lines. First, both the young Portuguese democracy and the Federal Republic were keen to quickly integrate Portugal into the EC. Although the process was marked by hitches, the extremely positive bilateral relationship between Germany and Portugal must be emphasised as a factor conducive to EC accession. Secondly, the economic relationship between the two countries deepened. However, the economic aid already mentioned was also flanked by incentives for German investment, from which sustainable cooperation developed. Thirdly, the development of democratic structures in Portugal remained an important pillar of bilateral relations, which were also largely provided by party-affiliated foundations. Finally, the successful integration of 100,000 Portuguese guest workers within Germany was acknowledged in bilateral talks under the Kohl government.